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INTELLIGENCE AND DEMOCRATIZATION: 




To consolidate the new democracies that have emerged worldwide during 
the last decade and a half is the main political challenge facing political leaders in 
these countries and world leaders at the beginning of the twenty-first century.  
Democratic consolidation requires restructuring the economy and bringing the 
armed forces under democratic civilian control.  And, within the latter task 
probably the most problematic issue in civil – military relations is control of the 
intelligence apparatus.  This is due not only to the legacies of the prior, non-
democratic, regimes in which the intelligence or security apparatus was a key 
element of control, and in which human rights abuses often followed, but also to 
the inherent tension everywhere between intelligence and democracy.  Admiral 
Stansfield Turner, a former Director of Central Intelligence, highlights this 
tension: “Secret agencies within democratic governments are anachronisms, 
because popular controls break down when citizens cannot know everything their 
government is doing.”1 
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 Admiral Stansfield Turner, Secrecy and Democracy: The CIA in Transition (Boston, Houghton 
Mifflin Company, 1985), p. 3. I use quotes from this book with some frequency for several 
reasons. Turner was Director of Central Intelligence from 1977 to 1981 and as such, head of the 
largest intelligence community in the world. The period was characterized by the consolidation of 
changes in the system due to the exposes after the Watergate scandal and the alleged assassination 
attempts of foreign leaders resulting in congressional hearings and the imposition of congressional 
oversight.  And Turner an outsider to the community himself working for an outsider president, is 
most candid about the intelligence agents as professionals and the bureaucratic nature of the 
2 
The purpose of this article is to describe the structures and processes 
involved in the intelligence function, analyze the challenge of democratic control 
of intelligence organizations with primary attention to new democracies, and 
highlight in particular the importance of intelligence as a profession in this regard.   
Any discussion of control and intelligence is difficult, and for several reasons.  
First, the terms and concepts associated with intelligence are not agreed upon and 
are ambiguous.  Second, much about intelligence is secret; knowledge is power 
and those who hold it want to keep it secret.  The intelligence professionals are a 
special club even within their own militaries or civilian organizations.  They 
minimize the knowledge outsiders have about them and their activities.  Third 
there is little written about intelligence and democratization.  There is some good 
material on intelligence and democracy, but this pertains to the established 
democracies such as Great Britain, France, and the United States where the goal is 
to reiterate the need to control the intelligence apparatus lest it undermine the 
democracy.2 
 
The Counterintelligence State 
In virtually all authoritarian regimes (including the former Soviet bloc) the 
intelligence apparatus was a key element for maintaining power.  These regimes 
                                                                                                                                                              
intelligence community. As a manager of the intelligence community, he conveys the sense of 
control that is the focus of this paper.  It must be noted that he was not popular with large sectors 
of the community..  
3 
were based on something other than democratic legitimacy exercised through free 
elections.  They had to rely on organizations to identify domestic opponents, 
neutralize their opposition to the government, and seek through a variety of 
means, including a controlled media, to generate at least domestic apathy. In most 
cases these organizations were intelligence services.  Precisely because of this 
heavy reliance and its centrality to power, the intelligence apparatus grew in size 
and power, with the result that they were largely autonomous even within 
authoritarian regimes.3  In these countries, intelligence meant mainly 
counterintelligence. That is, protecting the state’s secrets from outsiders.  And, as 
almost anything could be defined as a state secret the scope of that which had to 
be controlled was immense.  And, while in most instances the intelligence service 
linked internal opposition to putative foreign enemies, the overwhelming focus of 
the intelligence service in most countries was domestic opposition and not other 
states.4 
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 See the note on sources and author’s expertise at the end of this article. 
3
 For excellent insights into the scope and power of intelligence in a ‘typical’ authoritarian regime 
see Alfred Stepan, Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1988), pp. 19-20 where he compares the prerogatives of the Brazilian 
National Security Service (SNI) to the intelligence organizations in several established 
democracies. 
4
 In the USSR, and now Russia, scholars have coined the term “counterintelligence state” to 
capture the sense of its pervasiveness.  Waller defines it as follows: “The counterintelligence state 
is characterized by the presence of a large, elite force acting as the watchdog of a security defined 
so broadly and arbitrarily that the state must maintain an enormous vigilance and enforcement 
apparatus far out of proportion to the needs of a real democracy, even one as unstable as that of 
Russia. This apparatus is not accountable to the public and enjoys immense police powers with 
few checks against it. The powers are not designed to protect the rights of the individual, despite 
rhetoric to the contrary, but to protect the privileges of the ruling class and the chekist organs 
themselves.” J. Michael Waller, Secret Empire: The KGB in Russia Today (Boulder: Westview 
4 
Undoubtedly the most negative legacy of the intelligence services in the 
new democracies was their involvement in human rights abuses.  The information 
they gathered on their own people was at times obtained with abusive methods 
and used in arbitrary and violent means to eliminate domestic opposition.  They 
are, in short, integrally associated with the human rights abuses which 
characterize most authoritarian regimes most of the time. While the overall 
popular legacy is negative, there is little awareness of intelligence functions and 
organizations.  Most civilian politicians, let alone the public at large, do not know 
enough about intelligence to be able to have an informed opinion about it.  In 
some countries there is real concern that the intelligence apparatus has archived, 
and is still collecting, information that could be used against average civilians and 
politicians.  Thus not only is there a lack of information, but it is combined with 
fear, which perpetuates the lack of information. 
 
The Challenge of Democratic Consolidation 
Despite efforts by students of comparative politics to develop models of 
democratic transitions, these transitions are largely sui generis and defy 
generalization.  Studies have shown that the authoritarian regimes collapsed due 
to their successes as well as their failures, or the actions or inaction by domestic 
elites or foreigners, but in any case power finally passed on to more or less 
                                                                                                                                                              
Press, 1994), p. 13. The original conceptualization was by John J. Dziak, Chekisty: A History of 
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popularly elected civilians.5  Transitions are one thing, which mainly allowed 
new, democratic, regimes to emerge, but they do not necessarily result in stable 
democratic regimes.  Today, in the field of comparative politics, the main focus is 
on democratic consolidation.  Consolidation is a useful concept because it reflects 
the idea that a new regime’s structures and processes are becoming stable.  That 
is, a democratic regime is consolidated when the elites and the masses accept it as 
“the only game in town.”6  This acceptance is no easy task, especially if one 
considers the basic characteristics for a regime to be termed democratic.  A 
standard definition of democracy today is as follows: 
Modern political democracy is a system of governance in which rulers are 
held accountable for their actions in the public realm by citizens, acting 
indirectly through the competition and cooperation of their elected 
representatives.7 
 
For the accountability to function procedural minimal conditions are necessary. 
They include the often–noted seven fundamental guarantees ensuring free and fair 
elections such as freedom of speech, association, running for office, and the like, 
which constitute a corpus or guarantees requiring a supportive culture or value 
                                                                                                                                                              
the KGB (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1988).  
5
 Thus rather than explanation one of the most highly regarded students of comparative politics 
comes up with “factors” explaining transitions. See Samuel Huntington, The Third Wave 
Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991).  
6
 Among other sources on this approach see the following. John Higley and Richard Gunther, eds., 
Elites and Democratic Consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 3-4 and Juan J. Linz & Alfred Stepan, Problems of 
Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist 
Europe (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), pp. 5-6.  
6 
system to survive.  As more countries begin to consolidate their new democracies, 
scholars have identified a further defining characteristic, which is the requirement 
that no unelected body has authority over the popularly elected officials. 
A political situation in which these guarantees function is obviously very 
far from the prior authoritarian regime.  Major challenges are found both in the 
lack of recent experience with democracy and the difficulty of the population 
valuing these new structures and processes lacking this background.  Also, in 
most cases the countries are confronting economic problems often accompanied 
by social disruption.   Overall, democracy is a very demanding political system 
for elites and average citizens.  Both should be involved for it to function well. 
New democracies are very tentative.  The issue is how to develop the trust and 
transparency in the context of the legacies of the authoritarian regime.  It is 
possible that the intelligence apparatus is not under government control, but 
instead has power over the civilian officials.  This seems to be the case in Russia 
today.8   If the elected government does not control intelligence it is by definition 
not a consolidated democracy. 
                                                                                                                                                              
7
 Philippe C. Schmitter & Terry Lynn Karl, “What Democracy is…and Is Not,” in Larry Diamond 
and Marc F. Plattner, eds., The Global Resurgence of Democracy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1993), p. 40.  
8
 According to Waller the KGB, or its successors, remain very powerful. “Indeed, given the lack 
of meaningful controls over them, the security organs may be considered Russia’s fourth branch of 
government if not its core.” Waller, 1994, p. 296. See also pp. 219-20. This seems to be the 
general consensus regarding Russia. For example, Knight states “Real, lasting democracy is 
incompatible with a security apparatus wielding the power and influence that it still holds in 
Russia.” Amy Knight, Spies Without Cloaks: The KGB’s Successors (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1996), p. 244. 
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The Meaning of Intelligence 
Due to the scope and diversity of intelligence, there is disagreement on its 
meaning.9  Intelligence is mainly defined by process. That is, the process of 
gathering and using information for some purpose.  Since processes are varied, as 
are the sources of information and their ends,  much is of necessity left vague.  
Most discussions within the intelligence community center on tradecraft; the 
“how to” of sources and analysis rather than the “what is”?  Further the 
intelligence community either by design or habit is characterized by vagueness 
and ambiguity.  This attitude, or approach, is probably intentional: to not convey 
information.  Once one becomes aware of intelligence, and its limits, there is an 
even greater awareness that not everything is knowable, let alone known.  Further, 
intelligence officers are trained to collect information and not to provide it except 
to very few of their superiors with a need to know.   This tendency pervades the 
whole field of intelligence practice.  They are professionals in intelligence; 
information is their vocation.  It makes no sense to give it away, unless indeed it 
is disinformation. 
Given our purposes here, and focusing on the new democracies, we must 
use a broad definition of intelligence in order to convey the scope of what it can 
                                                           
9
 For a discussion of different meanings see Glenn Hastedt, “ Controlling Intelligence: Defining 
the Problem,” in Glenn Hastedt, ed., Controlling Intelligence (London: Frank Cass, 1991), pp. 6 – 
8.  
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include, which is extremely broad.10  Glenn P. Hastedt in Controlling Intelligence  
states succinctly:  “The four elements of intelligence are clandestine collection, 
analysis and estimates, covert action, and counter-intelligence.”11  Loch Johnson 
elaborates this synthesis: 
Intelligence commonly encompasses two broad meanings. First, the secret 
agencies acquire and interpret information about threats and opportunities 
that confront the nation, in an imperfect attempt to reduce the gaps and 
ambiguities that plague open sources of knowledge about the world. A 
nation especially seeks secret information to help it prevail in times of 
war, with as few casualties as possible. Second, based on information 
derived from denied and open sources, policymakers call upon their 
intelligence agencies to shield the nation against harm 
(counterintelligence) while advancing its interests through the secret 
manipulation of foreign events and personalities (covert action).                                
Intelligence thus involves both information and response.12 
 
For our purpose, intelligence is understood as these four functions: collection, 
analysis, counterintelligence, and covert action.  Intelligence also refers to the 
organization collecting the information and the information collected.  As all 
individuals and organizations collect and process information, this information in 
itself is not the defining characteristic. The key characteristics are that these 
functions are centered in and intended for the state and they are secret.  This 
knowledge thus has a dual nature; it is information but it is secret information 
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 For example, the CIA in its unclassified “A Consumer’s Guide to Intelligence” describes only 
sources and analysis. It does not include the more controversial intelligence functions of 
counterintelligence and covert action which are the focus of books in the memoir and expose 
categories.  This handbook is dated July 1995, was prepared by the Public Affairs Staff, and is 
coded PAS 95-00010. 
11
 Hastedt, 1991, p. 6. 
12
 Loch K. Johnson, Secret Agencies: U.S. Intelligence in a Hostile World (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1996), p. 119. 
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used by the state in potential or real conflicts.  What follows is a very brief review 
of these four functions.13 
 
Collection 
Intelligence organizations collect information.  The questions are what 
kinds of information do they collect and what means they employ to collect it.  At 
a minimum, they use what today are termed “open sources” which includes 
periodicals, “the web,” and seminars and conferences.  There is an ongoing debate 
regarding open vs. classified sources since so much information on so many 
topics is readily available.14  Another distinction is between human intelligence, 
or HUMINT, and scientific and technical intelligence to include SIGINT (from 
intercepts in communications, radar, and telemetry), IMINT (including both 
overhead and ground imagery), and MASINT (which is technically derived 
intelligence data other than imagery and SIGINT).  HUMINT is information 
collected directly by people and includes information provided by ambassadors or 
defense attaches as part of their normal reporting routines, information obtained at 
public and social events, and information obtained clandestinely through spies, 
reading others’ mail, and documents.  HUMINT is the traditional “espionage,” or 
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 For more details see CIA, July 1995; Roy Godson, Dirty Tricks or Trump Cards: American 
Counterintelligence and Covert Action (Washington: Brassey’s, 1995); Walter Laqueur, The Uses 
and Limits of Intelligence (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1995); and, Gregory F. 
Treverton,  Covert Action: The Limits of Intervention in the Postwar World (New York: Basic 
Books, Inc. 1987.) 
10 
spying, mainly the use of agents in another country to provide secret information 
to their managers who forward it to their home agencies. 
The richer countries have large investments and capabilities in scientific 
and technical intelligence.  In the United States, the bulk of the $27 billion annual 
intelligence budget goes to these technical forms of collection.15  They include the 
interception and processing of communications by phone, radio, and computers.  
The processing may well include decoding as well as translation.  Another source 
of scientific and technical intelligence is photo or image reconnaissance.   
Originally it could be simply an attaché taking picture of ships, planes, or tanks.  
It evolved with aerial reconnaissance, to include highflying airplanes undetectable 
or unreachable by a potential enemy. (As in the U-2 flights over Cuba during the 
1962 missile crisis).  And more recently, it consists of satellite 
photoreconnaissance or imagery.  This technology is becoming much more 
widely available.  Today a country can purchase from private firm’s photos that 
were unavailable or highly classified a few years ago.16 
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 See for example http://www.janes.com; http://www.stratfor.com; and http://www.indigo-
net.com/intel.htm for periodic open source intelligence analysis.  
15
 This figure, which is consistent with other published figures, is taken from Martin Petersen, 
“What We Should Demand From Intelligence,” National Security Studies Quarterly Vol. V, #2, 
Spring 1999, p. 111. 
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Raw intelligence is not much good without analysis.  Analysis, or the 
anticipation of analysis, also shapes collection requirements.  Analysis, what to 
conclude from raw information, has always been the big challenge in intelligence.  
In retrospect, the United States should have known about Japanese intentions at 
Pearl Harbor, the Argentines should have known about American and British 
reactions to the invasion of the Malvinas, and Saddam Hussein should have 
known that the United States would react forcefully to the invasion of Kuwait.  
The problem is not only with the processing of gigantic quantities of data, but 
even more with policy conclusions from available information. 
The intelligence professional must convince policy makers of the accuracy 
and relevance of the intelligence.  Production is only the first step; the intelligence 
must then be marketed.  Analysis, in short, is not a simple technical issue but 
rather includes methods, perceptions, and political preferences.  Much of the 
analytical literature on intelligence on the US and USSR. focuses precisely on 
whether, and to what extent, leaders use the information provided to them by the 
intelligence organizations.17 
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 See for example Michael I. Handel, ed., Leaders and Intelligence (London: Frank Cass, 1989), 
Christopher Andrew, For the President’s Eyes Only: Secret Intelligence and the American 
Presidency from Washington to Bush (New York: Harper Collins, 1995.), and  Christopher 
Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin, The Sword and the Shield: The Mitrokhin Archive and the Secret 
History of the KGB (New York: Basic Books, 1999). For a short and useful discussion of the 
issues in production and consumption of intelligence see Mark M. Lowenthal, “Tribal Tongues: 




At its most basic, the purpose of counterintelligence is to protect the state, 
and its secrets, against other states or organizations.  Seemingly clear and 
straightforward in these terms, in fact it becomes, in the words of the long-time 
and controversial head of counterintelligence at the CIA, James Angleton “‘the 
wilderness of mirrors,’ where defectors are false, lies are truth, truth lies, and the 
reflections leave you dazzled and confused.”18  Abram N. Shulsky defines the 
scope of issues involved: 
In its most general terms, counterintelligence refers to information 
collected and analyzed, and activities undertaken, to protect a nation 
(including its own intelligence-related activities) against the actions of 
hostile intelligence services. Under this definition, the scope of 
counterintelligence is as broad as the scope of intelligence itself, since all 
manners of hostile intelligence activities must be defended against.19 
 
Memoir accounts, as well as books by students of intelligence, indicate that 
counterintelligence has the greatest negative implications for democracy due to 
surveillance of the citizenry.20  The implications for democracy are much more 
severe in new democracies where counterintelligence was the principal function 
of intelligence services. The intelligence service sought to root out real and 
imaginary enemies of the state, often resulting in yet more opposition leading to a 
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 Peter Wright (with Paul Greengrass), Spy Catcher The Candid Autobiography of a Senior 
Intelligence Officer (New York: Viking, 1987), p. 305.  
19
 Abram N. Shulsky (Revised by Gary J. Schmitt), Silent Warfare: Understanding the World of 
Intelligence (Washington: Brassey’s, 1993), p. 111. 
20
 Shulsky, 1993, p. 163. For the implications of this surveillance for the citizens in Great Britain 
see Peter Wright, 1987. Wright was in the leadership of MI5, the British Security Service, for two 
decades, including the height of the Cold War.  
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spiral of violence.  If even in established democracies a certain amount of 
paranoia is inherent in counterintelligence – “there is an enemy at work here and 
we must root him out,” in less institutionalized and non-democratic Third World 
countries this attitude routinely resulted in extreme violation of human rights and 
impunity for the intelligence agents.21 
 
Covert Actions 
Covert actions, or as the British term them “special political actions” and 
the Soviets “active measures,” are actions intended to influence another state by 
means that are not identified with the state behind the actions.  While covert 
action is not always included in government documents as part of intelligence, it 
is the topic most often featured in the books on controversial actions, including 
intelligence fiascoes.  It was the Watergate cover-up and covert actions, the coup 
in Chile and death of Allende in 1973, and various assassination attempts of 
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 Gill, 1994, provides an excellent analysis on what he terms “state and security intelligence”.  To 
convey the sense or mood within which the Cold War was fought by U.S. intelligence many use 
the following quote from the Doolittle Report, presented to President Eisenhower in 1954: “It is 
now clear that we are facing an implacable enemy [the USSR] whose avowed objective is world 
domination by whatever means and at whatever cost. There are no rules in such a game. Hitherto 
acceptable norms of human conduct do not apply. If the U.S. is to survive, long-standing 
American concepts of "“fair play"” must be reconsidered. We must develop effective espionage 
and counter-espionage services. We must learn to subvert, sabotage and destroy our enemies by 
more clear, more sophisticated and more effective methods than those used against us. It may 
become necessary that the American people will be made acquainted with, understand and support 
this fundamentally repugnant philosophy.” Quoted in Johnson, 1996, p. 138. Throughout Latin 
America this same paranoia, which may well have had a real basis in fact, was conveyed in the 
concept of the “national security state.”   
14 
nations’ leaders that resulted in the Church and Pike committees in the U.S. 
Congress in the mid-1970s which asserted greater control over the CIA. 
There are three main categories of covert action.  The first is propaganda 
which includes the utilization of the media in another country to convey a certain 
message.   The second is political action which includes funding or other support 
to government leaders, political parties, unions, religious groups, the armed 
forces, and the like to follow a certain course of action in another country.  The 
third type of covert action is paramilitary activity, which involves the use of force.  
It includes smaller actions, like assassination or arming and training a small 
contingent of dissident tribal groups, or it can be large such as the Bay of Pigs 
invasion.  The problem is that any large action cannot remain covert for long, and 
even with smaller actions it does not take much imagination to determine the 
country behind the action.  While there is a considerable literature on U.S. and 
Soviet covert actions, and little on other countries, this does not mean that other 
countries do not also engage in covert actions.  Indeed, countries seek to use their 
foreign intelligence service, including military attaches, to not only gather 
information but also to influence policies in another country.  Mr. Richard Bissell 
has elaborated a rationale for covert action: 
It becomes overwhelmingly obvious that we are deeply concerned with the 
internal affairs of other nations and that, insofar as we make any effort to 
encourage the evolution of the world community in accord with our 
values, we will be endeavoring purposefully to influence these affairs.  
The argument then turns out to be not about whether to influence the 
15 
internal affairs of others, but about how….  Open diplomacy, however, 
has its limitations as a policy tool.  There are times when a great power 
can best attain its objectives by acting in total secrecy.…  On certain 
occasions, however, a great power may seek to influence the internal 
affairs of another nation without its knowledge or without the knowledge 
of the international community.  These circumstances require covert 
action.22 
 
This justification is not limited to a great power.  Obviously not every country has 
robust capabilities in all four intelligence functions, but the fact that they exist, 
that any nation has these capabilities, means that this is the global framework 
within which intelligence must be understood.  Intelligence is created to defend 
the state.  It must defend it within the context of potential enemies, and taking into 
consideration the instruments they have available.  All countries have some 
degree of awareness of the intelligence capabilities of other countries and that 
they will be involved in, or even the target of, collection and covert action.  Since 
this is the case, they will respond as best they can with collection, analysis, 
counterintelligence, and maybe covert action of their own. 
 
Intelligence and Democracy 
All countries have an intelligence apparatus of some scope and capability.  
The question for new democracies is: what kinds of intelligence do they need and 
how can it be controlled?  While the challenge is especially severe in the new 
democracies, democratic control of intelligence is a challenge everywhere for at 
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 Richard M. Bissell, Jr. (with Jonathan E. Lewis and Frances T. Pudlo), Reflections of a Cold 
16 
least four reasons.   First, as Pat Holt states “Secrecy is the enemy of 
democracy.”23  Why?  Because secrecy encourages abuse.  If there is secrecy how 
can there be accountability, the operative mechanism of democracy?   Because 
intelligence organizations are secret they themselves can avoid the checks and 
balances on which democracy is based.  Second, intelligence agencies are not 
only secret but these organizations also collect and analyze information, and 
information means power.   Intelligence organizations take on agendas and 
purposes of their own.  Secrecy limits public scrutiny. Peter Gill uses the model of 
the “Gore-Tex” state to illustrate the degree of penetration by the security 
intelligence services.  Information flows in one direction and not two directions; 
to the intelligence services and not from them to state and society.24  Intelligence 
may be autonomous from state control and, through the use of information that 
others do not have, influence or even determine policy.  There are two further 
perceptual or behavioral elements, beyond secrecy and the unique control of 
information, that hinder democratic control of intelligence organizations.  Third, 
intelligence agents and organizations routinely break laws abroad.   Indeed, in 
most cases they do not admit to who they are or for whom they work.  Further, 
spying is illegal everywhere.  Intelligence managers provide undeclared funds to 
foreign nationals as agents and authors of articles, tap phones, steal documents, 
                                                                                                                                                              
Warrior: From Yalta to the Bay of Pigs (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996), pp. 207-7. 
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 Pat M. Holt, Secret Intelligence and Public Policy: A Dilemma of Democracy (Washington: CQ 
Press, 1995), p. 3.  
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and the like, all of which are illegal.  There may be a problem in making the 
distinction between breaking laws abroad and not breaking them at home.  Fourth 
is the self-justification that intelligence is critical to defense of the nation.  In the 
words of Peter Wright, “It [intelligence] is a constant war, and you face a 
constantly shifting target.”25   It is up to the intelligence organizations to root out 
spies, domestic and foreign, who are threats to the nation.  They may easily 
perceive that they, more than anyone else, really know what is going on; how 
dangerous the threat really is.  Intelligence officers’ task is to identify threats to 
the nation, and there are always threats; the only question is, how serious are the 
threats.  They know things, and others do not, and this may lead to a certain 
condescending attitude regarding others who are not in the know, who are not 
initiated into the club.26 
In view of the difficulty everywhere to control intelligence, and 
considering the background in most new democracies, what are the choices to be 
made and their implications for democratic control?  Initially, and this is really a 
requirement that is the same regarding the armed forces in general, democracies 
must establish a clear and comprehensive legal framework.  Intelligence is 
“slippery,” and if the legal framework is not clear and explicit intelligence 
agencies can never be brought under control.  The legal framework must emerge 
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from the democratic structures and processes, and must seek to ensure in the area 
of intelligence the continuation of the democratic values that they seek to 
promote. 
There are three general decisions to be made regarding intelligence, which 
should be stipulated, in this clear and explicit legal framework.  The first choice is 
to determine which of the four intelligence functions will be implemented and 
how much of the country’s resources will be allocated to them.  The former part 
of the question can be answered only by assessing the global and regional 
situation, alliances, recent history, and available resources. The latter part of the 
question is a political decision.  How much is intelligence worth?  Obviously it is 
worth a great deal if it provides the nation with the means to maintain its 
independence in the face of a hostile neighbor.  Intelligence also can be valuable 
in lieu of larger forces.  It can allow a country to focus its forces on the most 
serious threats thereby minimizing redundancy and higher operational costs.  But 
to assess what it is really worth requires a political decision.  Does the mere fact 
of having a certain level of intelligence capability avoid hostile intentions and 
actions?  It also depends on its relationship with other, more powerful, countries 
that may share intelligence capabilities with it.  Neither of these decisions can be 
made in a vacuum, and they should be integrated into an overall framework for 
decision - making in defense.  The main point is, however, that there must be an 
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analysis of what the nation requires and how much it is willing to pay for it.  This 
is, of course, a general issue in civil – military relations. 
The second choice concerns the balance in intelligence between civilian 
and military organizations, both in terms of production (collection and analysis) 
and consumption.  In most countries, intelligence has been a military monopoly in 
production and consumption.  During democratic consolidation there are 
decisions to be made as to whether military intelligence should be replaced in 
whole or in part by new civilian organizations.  Should the military have 
responsibilities only in military intelligence and civilians assume responsibility in 
strategic intelligence and counterintelligence?  Equally important as collection is 
consumption.  To whom is the intelligence product distributed?  Only the 
president of the country, his director for intelligence, members of the cabinet such 
as Interior, only the military, the congress, who else?  Obviously access to the 
information, and the form in which it is made available, has great implications for 
the potential power of those who receive it. 
A sub-theme of this balance between civilian and military institutions is 
the issue of internal and external intelligence.  Does the same organization have 
responsibility for domestic intelligence as well as foreign intelligence?  The 
former is of course mainly counterintelligence.  Are these functions fused?  If so, 
what are the controls so that it is not used for personal political purposes?  In most 
democracies the functions are separate.  In the United States, the Federal Bureau 
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of Investigation handles counterintelligence within the United States, and the 
Central Intelligence Agency has performed both functions outside the country.  In 
most European democracies the functions are divided between counterintelligence 
and foreign intelligence, the organizations doing their tasks wherever necessary, 
at home or abroad. 
The third choice concerns the relationship between intelligence and policy.  
This also logically involves the issue of coordination among the intelligence 
organizations.  Is all intelligence formally coordinated by a director of central 
intelligence as in the United States, but separate from policy (the DCI is not in the 
cabinet)?  Or, is it separate as with MI 5 and MI 6 in Great Britain but located 
within the Foreign Office thus linking it with policy?  The main issue here 
concerns an ongoing debate about the implications for objective intelligence 
analysis when it is closely linked to policy vs. the supposed loss of efficiency by 
having intelligence that is not linked.  There are great variations in how different 
democracies handle this issue.27  The answer depends on the political traditions 
and structures of the country, but the underlying issue of policy-relevant but not 
policy-driven intelligence is what must be assessed.  A critique of covert action in 
the United States is that these actions fuse all within the CIA.  Rather than 
providing intelligence objectively, the agency also develops the policy, conducts 
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it, and largely evaluates its success.  Hastedt, who has published one of the few 
books on controlling intelligence, makes his position explicit on this issue: “The 
purpose of intelligence is to inform and warn policy-makers.  The choice of what 
to do lies with the policy-maker.  If intelligence is brought into too close a contact 
with policy making it runs the risk of being corrupted.”28 
All three of these decisions hold implications for democratic control over 
intelligence. The first choice, about intelligence functions, has obvious 
implications especially regarding counterintelligence.  The second, civilian vs. 
military location of the intelligence function has implications in terms of civilian 
control over the armed forces and then civilian control over intelligence.   Third, a 
very close link with policy can make intelligence less a function of information 
gathering and analysis, and more a tool used by political leaders to retain power. 
 
Explicit Mechanisms of Control over Intelligence 
A common mechanism to control intelligence is through its separation into 
different agencies.  Policymakers should prevent any single agency from having a 
monopoly on intelligence.  This is the model in the United States. A possible 
arrangement could be separate intelligence organizations for each of the armed 
forces and the police and separate organizations for domestic and foreign 
intelligence.  This proliferation of organizations may or may not be efficient, 
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since the different agencies battle among themselves, but it eliminates the chances 
of monopoly by any single organization or individual and creates opportunities 
for more democratic control. 
A second mechanism for democratic control is an oversight mechanism or 
mechanisms.  Does anyone have oversight over intelligence or does the apparatus, 
and it alone, have responsibility for monitoring its own performance?  The latter 
option is extremely dangerous.   In the United States oversight has expanded to 
the current situation where not only do the intelligence agencies have inspector 
generals, but also the executive has oversight bodies and the two houses of 
congress also have oversight committees.29  In Great Britain, oversight remains 
very limited but the democratic institutions are hallowed.  It seems necessary 
today in countries that are seeking to consolidate their democracies that if 
intelligence is to be under democratic civilian control then there must be 
oversight.  How far it extends, and under what terms it operates, will vary 
tremendously.  Oversight has immediate implications for control but also has 
implications for popular support for intelligence. 
Since knowledge equals power, it is important to specify who has access 
to the intelligence and in what form.  Is it limited only to the military or do 
civilians in the executive also have access?  What about the legislature?  Do any 
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or all of them have access even before operations such as covert actions?  This 
issue concerns not just immediate distribution of intelligence (which here extends 
to covert actions as well) but the general availability of information after a certain 
period of time. The possibility of wider distribution also holds implications for 
control.  If the agencies know that in the future the files will be open for public 
scrutiny, they must be careful of their behavior. 
There is a dilemma inherent in the issue of control and that is the trade-off 
between democratic control over intelligence and the effectiveness of the 
intelligence apparatus doing its critically important work to defend the nation.  
This dilemma can be reduced to the tension between accountability, which 
requires transparency, and intelligence, which requires secrecy.  For example, 
does legislative oversight result in agents being uncovered?   Democracies wrestle 
with this dilemma constantly and there is no easy or sure solution.  Rather, it 
requires constant attention and adjustment. 
The possibility exists that democratically elected civilians may not in fact 
be interested in controlling the intelligence apparatus in the new democracies.  In 
virtually all of these countries, the use of elections to determine access to power is 
a new and relatively fragile means of determining who has power.  Even in old 
and stable democracies leaders often prefer “plausible deniability” rather than 
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access to the information required to control a potentially controversial or 
dangerous organization or operation.30   Logically this would be even more the 
case in newer democracies.  First, the politicians may be afraid of antagonizing 
the intelligence apparatus through efforts to control it because the intelligence 
organization might have something embarrassing on them.   Second, they may be 
afraid because the intelligence organization in the past engaged in arbitrary and 
violent actions and the politicians are not sure that a corner has been turned.  
Third, there are probably no votes to be won in attempting to control an 
organization that most people want to ignore. 
We have found that the issue of democratic control of intelligence can be 
profitably discussed only in those polities that have already sorted out the larger 
issues of civilian control of the military and have begun to institutionalize the 
structures and processes for this control.   In the others the environment remains 
too tense for open discussion of intelligence organizations and oversight.   
Intelligence is nowhere the first issue the new civilian leadership wants to 
confront. 
 
Towards Democratic Control of Intelligence 
For those countries that want to begin to exert democratic civilian control 
over the intelligence apparatus there are several tasks that must be undertaken.  
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These tasks are similar to those of asserting civilian control over the military in 
general, but are more acute due to secrecy and the penetration of state and society 
in line with the counterintelligence function.31  The tasks that follow are not 
prioritized, and should be pursued simultaneously.  They concern civilian 
competence, public interest and then pressure, and the profession of intelligence. 
The first task is to motivate civilians to learn about intelligence so they can 
control it.  In most authoritarian regimes intelligence was monopolized by the 
military and civilians had no role whatsoever.  These countries will be unable to 
control intelligence unless they prepare civilians to learn enough both to 
understand what intelligence is all about and to achieve some degree of 
cooperation, if not respect, from the intelligence professionals.  None of this will 
be easy, but one has to start somewhere.  It should begin with the formal and 
public commitment by the government to reviewing intelligence to establish a 
new policy.  The commitment must also open the possibility for civilian positions 
in intelligence.  Otherwise, as in civil–military relations in general, no civilians 
will come forward if they do not anticipate viable careers.  Then, civilians can 
begin to learn about intelligence by reading the unclassified literature from 
several countries, and taking advantage of cooperative training arrangements in 
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intelligence with other nations.  It also makes sense to establish regional programs 
for them to share their insights and further develop their common fund of 
knowledge, with regional intelligence sharing programs an obvious result. 
The second task is broader and it is to encourage a political culture, which 
supports the legitimate role of intelligence in a democracy but does not allow it to 
run rampant. James A. Schlesinger made this point:  “to preserve secrecy, 
especially in a democracy, security must be part of an accepted pattern of 
behavior outside of government and inside.”32  The responsibility must go in both 
directions; from democratically elected civilians to control intelligence but from 
them as well to not release classified information for personal or political reason.  
How can this culture be encouraged?  As in the general case of democratic civil–
military relations, by generating a public debate.  The challenge is to break 
through the current apathy or fear of the population regarding intelligence by 
initiating the debate.  In some older democracies, including Canada, France, Great 
Britain, and the United States there is a fairly regular debate stimulated by non–
governmental organizations (NGOs) and the media, which is periodically 
dramatized by intelligence fiascoes that become public.  The role of the media is 
crucial, and their awareness of intelligence can be encouraged in the same manner 
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as the public.  Again, the debate can be stimulated by the politicians’ commitment 
to establish a policy on intelligence.  Such a debate has been initiated in a few 
newer democracies including Guatemala.  The Peace Accords between the 
government and the guerrillas signed in December 1996 stipulate, in several 
sections that intelligence will be transformed and put under civilian oversight.  
These commitments have led to public seminars on intelligence, publications by 
NGOs, and articles in the newspapers.33  In Argentina there also is a debate 
initiated by a small number of civilians realizing that democratic consolidation 
requires civilian control over intelligence.34 
The third task is not about civilians or the public in general, but concerns 
the selection, training, and overall preparation of intelligence professionals; those 
who specialize as intelligence agents working for the state.  The focus on 
intelligence as a profession is particularly apt since these professionals, more than 
any other single profession, are controlled even in a democracy by professional 
norms more than outside controls (such as oversight).35  In contrast, in addition to 
their self-policing, or ethic, doctors are regulated by the legal system and 
licensing boards, lawyers by the legal system and bar associations, politicians by 
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the legal system and elections, and the armed forces by budgets, promotions, and 
a myriad of civilian control mechanisms.  The intelligence professionals, 
however, are controlled only in the last analysis, if that, by the external structures 
and processes noted above.  They are granted impunity to break laws abroad and 
have tremendous leeway within their own country and organization.   As 
illustrated in virtually all the books and articles dealing with intelligence agents, 
secrecy allows them to operate with a tremendous amount of autonomy.  There 
are few checks because they operate secretly, they are ensconced in a bureaucracy 
with other like-minded agents and develop a closed-club mentality, and they are 
very suspicious of outsiders, including at times their superiors. 
 
Intelligence as a Profession 
A profession can be defined in terms of the three criteria of expertise, 
corporateness, and responsibility.36  In the case of the intelligence professional the 
criteria are as follows: 
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First, their expertise is defined in accord with the four intelligence 
functions of collection, analysis, counterintelligence, and covert action described 
above.  The range of what intelligence professionals do is extremely diverse.  
What unifies them, or defines them as intelligence professionals, is secrecy.  
Unlike other professions, but for certain limited aspects of patient or client 
privacy or privilege, the intelligence professional is defined by secrecy.  (The 
military profession also has elements of secrecy but mainly these pertain to 
intelligence.)  In reference to covert actions one of the foremost American 
intelligence professionals, Richard M. Bissell Jr. states: 
The professional competence of a clandestine service consists of, and is 
measured by, its ability to carry out operations secretly (or deniably), 
much as lawyers’ competence consists in their ability to win cases, and 
doctors’ in their ability to prevent or treat illness. The clandestine  service 
may number among its members brilliant journalists, able warriors, and 
superior political analysts, but the professional skill for which, 
presumably, they are hired is the ability to organize and conduct 
operations covertly. This is a rather specialized skill not widely found 
outside of intelligence and internal security services.37 
 
And, in reference to counterintelligence one of the foremost British intelligence 
professionals states: 
The profession of intelligence is a solitary one. There is camaraderie, of 
course, but in the end you are alone with your secrets. You live and work 
at a feverish pitch of excitement, dependent always on the help of your 
colleagues. But you always move on, whether to a new branch or 
department, or to a new operation. And when you move on, you inherit 
new secrets which subtly divorce you from those you have worked with 
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before. Contacts, especially with the outside world, are casual, since the 
largest part of yourself cannot be shared.38 
 
Their expertise is thus diverse, as is intelligence itself, and the defining 
characteristic of the profession is secrecy. 
Second, their corporateness is defined by their access to secret systems, 
documents, information, and operations.  As doctors enter the profession through 
boards and internships & residencies, and lawyers by the bar exams, intelligence 
professionals enter via security clearances.  Clearances are the control mechanism 
for entry into and continuing in the profession.  There are few educational 
requirements in common for intelligence professionals, and there is little else that 
defines their corporate identity but for their access to classified information.39   In 
intelligence everything is compartmented; different levels of clearances plus the 
need to know determine access.  Even agents with similarly high clearances do 
not, are not supposed to, discuss information unless they have the need to know in 
terms of their current projects and responsibilities.  The security clearances, the 
working together in secret and on secret information and projects, create 
identification as a member of a unique club.   It may also breed certain arrogance, 
or sense of impunity, since if nobody else knows then how can those that don’t 
know control those that do? 
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Third, the responsibility of the intelligence professional is to serve in 
defense of the state.  But if we consider the first two criteria of expertise in secret 
matters and access via security clearances, we are led inexorably to a profession, 
which largely governs itself according to its own definition of responsibility.   In 
new democracies this is doubly serious, as the state was not accountable to the 
general population and the intelligence agents may not have even been 
responsible to the small group in control of the state.  Who can know and who is 
to control?  The sense of responsibility is incredibly important, and even in stable 
democracies enough incidents come to light to cause concern that the agents are 
not serving the state.  Or, better, they are serving it in their limited organizational 
terms and not those of the democratically elected leaders.  This sense is captured 
in a quote from James Angleton when testifying before Congress on why the CIA 
had not destroyed stocks of a toxic poison: “It is inconceivable that a secret 
intelligence arm of the government has to comply with all the overt orders of the 
government.”40  It is difficult to accommodate this kind of attitude with the 
principles and procedures of democracy. 
 
To Change a Profession 
This review of the defining characteristics of the intelligence profession 
suggest that major efforts must be made in the new democracies to promote and 
                                                           
40
 Quote in Admiral Stansfield Turner, 1985, p. 178.  
32 
inculcate a sense of professional responsibility by making the agents and agencies 
responsible to the state via the democratically elected leaders.  How to do this?  
Only by committing great attention and resources to recruitment, training, and 
obligating that the professionals remain involved in the larger polity and society.  
The specifics of this prescription have to be defined separately for each nation.  
One of the biggest difficulties is that the government will most easily recruit 
retired military into civilian intelligence positions.  They may have taken off the 
uniform, but their attitudes remain the same as those of everyone around them.  If 
new personnel cannot be found, then can their ethic of responsibility be changed?  
In most countries, including the older democracies, there is little explicit attention 
to promoting this ethic.41  In the older democracies the larger society supports 
responsibility to the democratic state and the institutions are not under question so 
there is less need to promote the ethic.  In the newer democracies there is clearly a 
need to promote it as well as promoting an open debate on intelligence and 
interesting civilians in the field.42 
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All nations engage in intelligence activities at one scale or another.  They 
must as other countries do, and no nation can afford to not know what is going on 
outside and inside their country, and if necessary counter other countries’ efforts 
to influence developments in that country.  In most of the world intelligence 
services of authoritarian regimes were central to the survival of those regimes and 
in the most negative manner imaginable.  Today, in the midst of challenges to 
democratic consolidation, seeking to ensure democratic control over intelligence 
is both necessary and extremely difficult.  In many countries there is virtually no 
public recognition of this fact.  Without decisive action, however, the intelligence 
apparatus will remain a state within a state and prevent democratic consolidation.  
Like all else in civil–military relations, the challenges are many and it requires 
continual efforts on the part of civilians and officers to achieve the most 
appropriate balance of efficiency and transparency for the country. 
 
A Note on Sources and Expertise 
The literature on intelligence is routinely broken down into four 
categories:  memoirs of retired intelligence professionals; exposes by disgruntled 
former professionals, journalists, and activists; government reports, studies, and 
documents; and academic studies.  Of these four categories only the last is largely 
objective.  The other three are motivated by personal, partisan, or national goals, 
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and thus contains some kind of bias or “agenda.”  Further, the literature in any 
one category is not so abundant that the interested student can dispense with 
material in any one of these categories.  This is not the place to assess the 
literature in general, but to highlight that there is much material on the United 
States and now Russia, less on European democracies and South Africa, and very 
little on the new democracies in book or journal articles.  Now, with the Internet 
there are available sources of information on aspects of intelligence throughout 
the world.  There is not, however, to the best of my knowledge, any literature to 
provide the background and discussion of issues in which to locate this current 
Internet information on the new democracies.  In sum, the material is sketchy and 
an overall conceptual framework is yet to be written. 
To write this article I drew on the available literature less for inspiration 
and analysis, and more for examples of the points I wanted to make.  My 
background and current activities are what provided the framework.  I attended 
graduate school in Political Science at the University of California at Berkeley 
during the 1960s.  After completing my studies in 1969 I taught at McGill 
University, Montreal until 1987.  During that time I researched on “hot” topics; 
first on politics and religion in Brazil (during the authoritarian regime) and later 
on the Portuguese Revolution and its path to democratic consolidation.  During 
that period of two decades I had occasion to meet intelligence agents abroad who 
would ask me lots of questions but never told me anything.   Lacking reciprocity I 
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avoided contact with them.  In 1987 I joined the Naval Postgraduate School and 
in 1989 became chairman of the Department of National Security Affairs.  In that 
position I qualified to receive a high security clearance because I had to attend 
meetings and read documents requiring it.  Having the clearance allowed me to 
learn quite a lot about the United States intelligence community with seminars 
and meetings at the CIA, Defense Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, 
Office of Naval Intelligence, Office of the Joints Chiefs of Staff and Office of the 
Secretary of Defense at the Pentagon, regional headquarters of the armed forces, 
and American embassies abroad.  Because our department offers one of the two 
masters degree programs in intelligence (the other is the Joint Military 
Intelligence College), we have alumnae in intelligence positions thoughout the 
community.  Through these contacts, and involvement with our courses, faculty, 
and students, I became interested in intelligence as a field of study.  I could then 
appreciate the “one-way street” of information in my earlier experience since I 
had not been “cleared” at that time.  Unfortunately for the field of study, as noted 
in the text of this article, most of intelligence is “slippery” in that there is much 
information on systems, tradecraft, and wiring diagrams, but little analysis of 
intelligence as organization and system.  The effort is put into analysis of the 
information and not the organization. 
When the Center for Civil–Military Relations was founded in 1994 I 
became involved as director of the programs in Latin America.  It was clear to 
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me, with my background in Brazil and Portugal, that intelligence is a core topic in 
civil–military relations.  Consequently we include a block of study on it in most 
of our programs in the region.  We also developed a full week program on the 
topic of intelligence and democracy held in Buenos Aires in August 1998.  The 
experience throughout Latin America, and especially Argentina, brought me into 
contact with officers who are intelligence professionals and a small number of 
civilians who are interested in intelligence.  Hopefully the democratic 
consolidation of that continent and others will continue apace, and the elected 
civilian leadership in all of the countries will feel secure enough to assert control 
over intelligence
